An SBOM generated by syft, cdxgen or Trivy carries the NTIA minimum elements and stops there. FDA's premarket cybersecurity guidance asks for two more things, per software component, that no SBOM generator emits: the level of support, and the end-of-support date. This page is the template for that addendum, a filled-in example, and the guidance text the columns come from. Free, nothing to download, no sign-up.
The guidance asks for a machine-readable SBOM consistent with the NTIA minimum elements, and then adds two per-component values on top. The minimum elements are the identity of a component; these two are its future. Nothing in a build tree answers them, which is why they come from a document rather than a scanner.
“The software level of support provided through monitoring and maintenance from the software component manufacturer (e.g., the software is actively maintained, no longer maintained, abandoned); and the software component's end-of-support date.”
FDA, “Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions”, issued 3 February 2026, section V.A.4(b). Docket FDA-2021-D-1158.The minimum elements FDA incorporates by reference are these seven, from the NTIA report:
Supplier name · Component name · Version of the component · Other unique identifiers · Dependency relationship · Author of SBOM data · Timestamp
NTIA, “The Minimum Elements For a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)”, published 12 July 2021 under Executive Order 14028. Available from ntia.gov. FDA's own sentence in V.A.4(b) also cites, by title and as October 2021, NTIA's “Framing Software Component Transparency: Establishing a Common Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)”; the elements themselves are set out in the July 2021 report. Both documents are named here rather than one being silently preferred.Neither “level of support” nor “end-of-support date” is among those seven. That gap is the whole reason this addendum is a separate table instead of a column in your existing SBOM.
Seven columns. The first three identify the component, the next two are what FDA asked for, and the last two are the ones a reviewer will ask about if you leave them out.
| Column | What goes in it |
|---|---|
component | The component name, exactly as it appears in the SBOM. Not a prettier version of it — a reviewer has to be able to match the two documents row for row. |
version | The version in the SBOM. If the SBOM has no version for a component, say so here rather than leaving the cell empty; a missing version is itself one of the minimum elements being unmet. |
identifier | The purl, CPE or other unique identifier from the SBOM. This is what ties the row to a vulnerability record later. |
levelOfSupport | One of: actively maintained, no longer maintained, abandoned, unknown. The guidance's own examples are the first three. Use unknown when you mean it — see §4. |
endOfSupportDate | A date, or an explicit statement that none is published. YYYY-MM-DD if you have one. “Not published by the supplier” is an answer; an empty cell is not. |
basis | Where the two values above came from: your own commitment, the supplier's published policy (with a URL and the date you read it), a public end-of-life dataset, or nothing. This is the column that makes the table auditable instead of asserted. |
notes | Anything a reviewer would otherwise have to ask. The place for “vendored and maintained in-house”, “supplier dissolved in 2024”, “support contract through 2029, reference on file”. |
As CSV, with the header row you can paste into a spreadsheet:
component,version,identifier,levelOfSupport,endOfSupportDate,basis,notesFour rows, chosen because each one is a different kind of answer. A real addendum is mostly rows like the first; the interesting ones are the rest.
| component | version | identifier | levelOfSupport | endOfSupportDate | basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
openssl | 3.0.11 | pkg:deb/debian/openssl@3.0.11 |
actively maintained | 2026-09-07 | Supplier's published release policy (openssl-library.org, read 2026-10-31): the 3.0 series is an LTS release supported to 7 September 2026. |
zlib | 1.2.13 | pkg:generic/zlib@1.2.13 |
actively maintained | Not published by the supplier | Upstream releases continue (most recent 1.3.1) but no end-of-support date is published for any version. Monitored at each firmware release instead of relying on a date. |
libfoo-rtos-shim | 0.4.2 | pkg:generic/libfoo-rtos-shim@0.4.2 |
no longer maintained | 2023-11-30 | Supplier's end-of-life notice, dated 30 November 2023, PDF on file. Replacement is tracked in the device's own risk file; this row exists so the submission does not imply the component is current. |
vendor-crypto-blob | unknown | none in SBOM | unknown | Not published by the supplier | Binary supplied under NDA with no version string and no published policy. Supplier asked for both on 2026-10-14; no answer yet. Carried into the submission as an open item rather than guessed at. |
The fourth row is the one worth copying the shape of. “We asked, on this date, and have not been told” is a defensible position. A blank cell is not, and an invented date is worse than either.
An empty cell in a spreadsheet is ambiguous between “nothing to say” and “nobody has written this yet”, and in a premarket submission those are very different things. Write the reason. NEEDS-HUMAN-INPUT, “not published by the supplier”, “requested 2026-10-14” — all of them beat whitespace.
A library with no commits for two years may be finished rather than dead, and a supplier may be maintaining it privately under a contract you hold. “Abandoned” is a statement about someone else's commitment; derive it from a notice, not from a commit graph.
Dependency relationship is one of the seven minimum elements. If your SBOM has only top-level edges, or none, say that in the addendum's notes. The absence of edges is not an assertion that a component has no dependencies, and a reviewer cannot tell the two apart from the file alone.
A wrong end-of-support date is worse than a stated unknown, because it quietly ages out of being wrong and into being relied upon. Date the evidence, not just the value: “read 2026-10-31” next to a URL tells a reviewer how stale the row is.
The addendum goes stale the moment the next firmware ships, which is the real reason it ends up being assembled by hand under deadline. Two things make that survivable: put the addendum under version control beside the SBOM rather than in a shared drive, and record the basis for every row so the next person can re-check one row instead of redoing the table. A row whose basis reads “supplier policy, read 2026-10-31” can be revalidated in a minute. A row with no basis has to be researched from scratch.
ceproof is a command-line tool that produces this addendum from a CycloneDX SBOM you already have, offline — your component list never leaves your machine. The free view tells you how many components have each of these two values and where the gaps are:
npx ceproof scan --profile fda --sbom firmware.cdx.jsonIt resolves the level of support and the end-of-support date in a strict order of precedence — your own declaration first, then one already carried on the imported SBOM, then a bundled end-of-life dataset, then an unknown that states its own reason. It never derives “abandoned” and never invents a date, for the reasons in §4. Everything it cannot answer it names as an open item.
The template on this page is free to use with or without the tool, and it is the same shape the tool emits. Nothing on this page requires a licence key.
If you would rather not assemble the addendum by hand every release, the paid tier that generates it as part of a submission pack is ceproof for FDA. The template and the free scan above stay free either way.
The example rows above are illustrative. openssl and zlib are real components and their basis cells name real sources read on 31 October 2026; libfoo-rtos-shim and vendor-crypto-blob are invented, to show the shape of a row you cannot fully answer. Check every date against the supplier before it goes in a submission.